Executive Compensation in Large Industrial Corporations by Wilbur G. Lewellen
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Executive Compensation in Large Industrial Corporations






Chapter Author: Wilbur G. Lewellen
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9355
Chapter pages in book: (p. 283 - 356)A PPENDIXESAPPENDIX A
DEDUCTIONS ANDEXEMPTIONS
AS A PER CENT OFINCOME
Information on the personal exemptions and the deductionsfrom tax-
able income claimed by iiidividuals having incomes of thesame order
of magnitude as those enjoyed by the executives in the samplewas
obtained from the Statistics ofIncomedata published by the Tnternal
Revenue Service for the six years 1944, 1947, 1950, 1953, 1956,and
1959. The ratio of the total of deductions and exemptionsto the ag-
gregate income received by all taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes
greater than $25,000 in each of those years was computed. Aggregate
income was defined as the sum of the reported adjustedgross income
and the amount of net long-term capital gains not already included in
AGE. The results were as follows (the underlying figures are recorded
in Table A-i).
DEDUCTIONS.;NI) EXEMPTIONS AS A PER CENT OF ALL INCOME
AG!
Class
Clearly, the ratios within each year are quite uniform across a broad
range of income classes, and they encourage the assumption of a single
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($000's) 1944 1947 1950 1953 1956 1959
25-50 10.8 11.9 13.7 18.3 16.4 18.1
50-100 9.9 10.8 11.3 15.7 14.1 15.8
100-ISO 10.1 IIM 10.7 14.3 14.8 15.6
150-200 10.7 11.5 10.4 14.6 15.3 16.2
200-500 10.9 11.0 11.1 1 fit) 15.4 16.0
500-1000 9.9 11.6 9.8 14.5 14.1 14.5
Over lOOt) 12.5 10.0 9.7 15.1 13.5 15.0AGI
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25-50 3,388.7 118.5 3,507.2 I 18.7 379,7 10.8
50-10(1 1,926(1 98.3 2.O24. 31.7 68.6 2(1(1.2 9.9
00-ISO 584.7 43.4 628.1 4.9 58.7 63.6 1(1,1
150-20(1 167.6 26.4 294.0 1.3 10.7
200-500 419.7 57.2 476.9 1.4 50.7 52.1 109
500-tOO)) 149.0 3 1.7 180.7 0.2 17.7 9,9
Ovcr 1000 11)9.6 19.8 I 29.4 (I. I 16. I 16.2 12.5
/9471)010
25-50 4,923.4 201.5 5,125.11 80.2 431.3 611.5 11.9
50-10(1 2,925.7 176.32,702.0 41.9 250.4 292.3 10.8
1(1(1-ISO 759.9 89.4 849.3 6.3 87.3 93.5 11.0
15(1-20(1 752.6 51.11 403.6 1.9 44.6 46.5 11.5
200-5(1(1 573.6 127.1 700.7 1.7 75.0 76.7 11,0
5(10-1000 21)1.8 53.1) 254.8 0.2 29. 19.6 116
Over 1(1(1(1 214.9 73.2 288.2 0.1 28.8 18.9 10.1
/951.) 1)otti
2 5-5(1 7,425.5 376.378(11.7 445.0 620.9I ((65.9 I
50-100 4,192.5 3(14.64.497,1 113.4 386 3 509.7 I 1.3
100-15(1 1,386.5 156.6 1.54 3. I 21.9 143.8 165.8 10.7
I 50--1011 676.8 98. 775.0 7.4 73.6 81.1) 0.4
200-50(1 1,141.2 229 () 1.37 1.2 144.9 152.2ILi
500-1000 419.5 132.4 551.8 51.8 3.S 9.8
Over 1000 433.4 131.3 564.7 0.3 54.3 54.7 9T
I'sill I'.'\-I
flC0H1CI)t1a
(dollar Iigtires in milJions)
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/95./ /),00
25-50 6,355.7 191.26,546.9 546.5 651.81,198.3 IS.
50-00 5,682.1 212.7 5,894.8 310.7 612.8 S 15.7
100-ISO 3,994.6239.34.233,9 20.2 484.2 604.5 4.3
150-200 1,638.7 84.0 (.822.6 23,6 243.3 266.9 14.6
200-500 753.1 148.! 9(11.2 4.9 138.7 143.7 1 (ill
500-1001' 252.4 69.5 321.9 ((.6 46.2 46.8 14.5
Over I (101) 275.3 70.8 346.1 0.2 52.1) S-i -, IS.'
1956 1)oti'
25-50 II .638.4 o7 3.012.311,4 753.3 1,262.52,015.9 16.4
50-lou 5,900.3 5 82.2 6,482.5 189.4 721.8 911 I-!.!
00-ISO 1,679.3 291.8 1.97 1.1 28.9 262.1 291.1) 14.8
50-20(1 659.1 138.2 797.3 7.9 114.3 1222 IS.3
200-50() 1,138.0320(1 1,458.1 8.1 216.5 224.6 15.4
500-1000 396.6 154.2 55(1.8 12 76.3 77.5 4.!
Over 000 549.6241.1 79(1.8 0.5 1(16.!) (16.5 13.5
/959 Dat a
25-50 14.148.')919615,068.5 956.3 .766.72.23.0 18.1
50-100 7.549.5 799.6 8,349.1 255.5 1,060.4 .3 15.9 15.8

















500-1000 478.2220.9 699.0 1.4 100.1 101.6 4.5
Over 100!) 545.6 258.0 803.6 ((.5 121).! 20.6 5.0292
APPENDIX A
flat rate for allindividuals. Moreover,there is a rather clear-cut (llffr_
cncc betweenthe experienceot the years 1944,I 947ui1 15O and
that observedthereafter. Almostall the figures in the earicr years fall
between 9.5 and11.5 per cent andin the later ones, between 14.5 and
16.0 per cent.Accordingly. the cOflVefltlOfladopted in the study, that
deductions andexemptions togetheramounted to 10 per cent of inco
through 1950 and 1 5 percent from then on. seems notonly a convefijent
but a fairly accuratecharacterization ot the actual historical pattern. As
long a corporateexecutives' behavior (lid notdiffer markedly from that
suggested by theaggregate figures forall individuals with sinailar in-
comes, thisconventiOn should be asuitable approximation of their
experience.
The supporting datafrom the Statistics ofInconetabulations for the
six years indicatedconsist of: (1) totaladjusted gross income on all re-
turns in eachAOL class (2) the amountof net long-term capital gains
included in the AGI figures;(3) total personal exemptions claimed b'
the taxpayers in eachclass (4) total deductionsclaimed in each class,
Since just one-halfof aggregate net long-termcapital gains are
counted in the reportedAOl figures, the sum of items (I)and (2)
represents the totalincome enjoyed by eachAGI category.APPENDiX B
MORTALiTY EXPERiENCE
TABULATIONS
Insurance companies compile, fromtheirpolicy underwriting ex-
perience, a record of the rate at which their policyholders of various
ages die. This information is organized and presented in the form of a
"mortality table." Since the classes of people who purchase different
kinds of insurance policies typically exhibit different longevity char-
acteristics, there exist not one but several such tables, each of which is
relevant to a particular type of insurance contract. All are revised
periodically to reflect new inforniation on longevity as it becomes avail-
able.
The tabulations are most commonly organized in the following man-
ner: An arbitrary group of individual policyholders all of a particular
and equally arbitraryage initially is hypothesized. The number out of
this group who will, on the basis of current experience, attain succes-
sively higher ages is then recorded. For example, if the table is begun















where 1, denotes the number of individuals who arc expected to live to
at least age .v. According to this table,of every1 0,000 policyholders
who are now age 5, 9994.41 are expected to attain age 6, 9989.22 to
attain age 7,5173.47 age75. 0.01 age 110, hut none age Ill.
Froni these figures, the probability that an individual of any given age
at the present time will live to any other given age can readily be corn-









And, of course, age 5 need not be the reference point in every case. The





In general, therefore, if we let ,p. denote the probability that an in-
dividual of age x now will attain age x + ii, we have
which permits us to utilize the raw data of the mortality table to analyzeAPPENDIX B 295
in any situation an executives prospects for actually receiving the pay.-
ments promised him under his company'spension plan.
For certain ealculations----inparticular, those concerned with the
value of whatever death benefits may he associated with thcompensa-
tion arrangement in question--it is useful to derive a SCCOfld set of
mortality tabulations from the information listed above: the number
of individuals out of the original 10,000 who are, on average, expected
to (lie after havingattained various ages. Thus we may define the
quantity d where
= lx - Ix+I
and construct an additional column in the mortalitytable:
The probability that anindividual now age 5 will dieafter attaining
age 7 but before attaining age8 therefore is
4.93-0.000493.
10000.00 -
If he reaches age 8. the likelihoodthat he will die betweenhis fiftieth
Agex 1,. (1

















here(jdenotes the probability that a manpresently age .v wifl (lie
within a year after attaining age x -f -Ii.Age .v
1IPPENJ)1X C
MORTALiTY TABLE FOR MALES
1951 GROUP ANNUITY
5 9999.9999 5.5900 31 9837.6874
6 9994.4099 5.1871 32 9827.3185
7 9989.2228 4.9347 33 9816.2922
8 9984.2881 4.8024 34 9804.5323
9 9979.4857 4.7502 35 9791.9727
Q 9974.7355 4.7579 36 9778.5185
II 9969.9776 4.8454 37 9764.0952
12 9965.1322 4.9427 38 9748.5996
13 9960.1895 5.0399 39 9731.9197
14 9955.1496 5.1468 40 9713.9254
15 9950.0028 5.2735 41 9694.4975
16 9944.7293 5.4099 42 9673.2472
17 9939.3194 5.5660 43 9649.5477
18 9933.7534 5.7318 44 9622.8281
19 9928.0216 5.9072 45 9592.5451
20 9922.1144 6.1120 46 9558.2038
21 9916.0(124 6.3462 47 9519.3497
22 9909.6562 6.5998 48 9475.5702
23 9903.0564 6.8628 49 9426.4867
24 9896.1936 7.1648 50 9371.7471
25 9889.0288 7.4959 51 9311.0650
26 9881.5329 7.8657 52 9244.1464
27 9873.6672 8.2741 53 9170.7664
28 9865.393 1 8.7309 54 9090.6964
29 9856.6622 9.2160 55 9003.7621
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Age x 1 d Age
51 8808.7082 108.3295 84 21 S39S7 295,0353
58 8700.3787 115.7324 85 I 857.3604 272.7571
59 8584.6463 123.4386 86 1 5$4.60u 248,5228
60 8461.2077 13l.6141 87 1 336.0805 223.28s8
61 8329.5936 140.4869 88 1112.7947 197.8404
62 8189.1067 150.2947 89 0914.9543 172.8523
63 8038.8120 161.3229 90 0742 10'o 148.861'
64 7877.4891 173.8326 91 0593.2408 126.0963
65 7703.6565 188.1079 92 0467.1445 105.1827
66 7515.5486 204.3703 93 0361.9618 086.3366
67 7311.1783 220.1542 94 0275.6252 069.6684
68 7091.0241 233.9045 95 0205.9568 05 5.2016
69 6857.1196 246.4654 96 0150.755? 042.8831
70 66 10.6542 259.8185 97 0107.8721 03 2 .6014
71 6350.8357 274.2481 98 0075.2707 024.2007
72 6076.5876 288.4291 99 0051.O7oo 01 7 .4928
73 5788.0955 301.4672 100 0033.5772 012. 27 12
74 5486.6283 313.1603 101 0021.306(3 008. 3208
75 5173.4680 322.9641 102 0012.9852 005 .4275
76 4850.5039 331.5174 103 0007.5577 003.4017
77 4518.9865 339.5205 104 0004.1560 002 .03 3 1
78 4179.4660 345.5875 105 0002.1229 001.1413
79 3833.8785 348.6759 106 0000.9816 000.5866
80 3485.2026 347.4015 107 0000.3950 000.2653
81 3137.8011 341.0978 108 0000.1297 000.0988
82 2796.7033 329,9523 109 0000.0309 000.0269
83 2466.7510 314.3553 110 0000.0040 000.0040APPENDIX D
PRESENT VALUE COMPUTATIONS
Illustrative Case
Consider the case of an executive who is now age 50 and who is
promised under his corporation's pension plan a retirement benefit of
2ft000 per year to begin at age 65 and continue for life. Let us as-
sume that our best estimate of the tax bracket he will be in upon retire-
ment suggests that, after personal taxes, this benefit will amount to
$10,000 each year. lithe annual discount rate which expresses the time
value of money to the executivehis relevant 'opportunity cost"is r,
the present value to him as of age 50 of the payment he expects to re-
ceive during the first year of his retirement is
= (SlO.00O)(i5po)(l +r)'5
where denotes the probability that he will in fact attain age 65 and
is equal to the ratio l/1from the appropriate mortality table.' Thus
this present value is really a pesent expected value. It represents the
(discounted) mean payoff associated with a discrete probability distribu-
tion, which, as it applies to each potential retirement benefit, has but
two possible outcomes: the man in question attains the age at whichthe
benefit is to be paid; or he dies beforehand. The complete expression for
PV(65) in this case therefore is
PV(65) = (S10,000)(15p50)(l ± rY'5 + (0)(l15po)(l +
But since the value of the second term isand, clearly, alwayswill be
zero, it may be neglected.
Similarly, the present value of the benefit due at age 66 is
= (Sl0,000)(16p5o)(l +rY'6.
'See Appendix B.
IF And. for the entire series nt lIhtIts:
11' Fl '(n)
-- (,c
where w refers to the highest age which, according tothe 1eleva1t
mortality table, the executive Cail possihlattain. In the instanceOf the
mortality table depicted in Appendix 13. for emple,'is equal to 110.
i'Iu' IVoiicoi; tr,1,igto, i
Since the only benefits one an eniployee under anol1COt1trjlLitr.
corporate pension plan are a series of equal atiiitial payillents he2irrnint
at retirement and continuing until he dies, the present value expression
for such an arrangement is quite simple.It will be assumed hereand
in each of the subsequent appendixes dealing with the value of these
plans that retirementis expected to occur at age 65. The actuarial
symbols defined in Appendix 13 will he used throughout.
If the annual before-tax retirement benefit pronhise(1 is SI and the
applicable etlective tax on it is denoted by t, the present value to a man
now age .v of the payment he expects to receive in the first year of his
retirement (at age 65) is





that of the payment anticipated in the following year is
PVRB(66) = (1t)(166)( I
and, in general,
PVRB(65 ± ii) = (I - 1) (a';:
z)
(..rY
for 0 :n35, since ageI 1(1is the ultimate age tabulated in the
mortality table employed here. If we then define
r
= V
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and multiply both numerator arid denominator of the expressions above
by Vr, they can be rewritten as:
PVRB(65) = (I1) (:)(65)(v6)= (I - t)(Dj
PVRB(66) = (I - t)(P6)
PVRB(65 ± ii) = (1 - 1)
This is a rather less cumbersome form with which to work.
The present value of the entire pension promise, comprised as itis
of only the indicated payments, is, therefore,
35
PV =PVRB(65 + n)
F1=1
--P±9 --"'+
And, finally, defining the symbol
110
N. = = D + D+1 + + D110,
we can write, as the relevant after-tax present value formula perdollar
of before-tax prospective retirement benefit,
IN65 PV=(l t)--
A tabulation of thealues for N and D. over the appropriate range of
ages then permits a rapid and convenientcomputation of the worth of
any noncontributory pension considered.
The Contributory Pension
The benefit format and tax treatnient of a contributorycorporate
pension plan are considerably more complex thanthose of its noncon-
tributory counterpart. There are three different setsof prospective pay-
ments under such a plan:C
/)
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I. The annualretirement hene fit iielf. due to begin at age 65and
continue thereafter tar the fife at the employee;
2. A death benefit payment eonsiting of a return of the interest_
accuniulated value of the employees contributions if he dies priorto
retirenient;
3 A death benefit payment equal tothe difference betweenthe
interest-accumulated value of the employee's contributions aS of age 65
and the aggregate retirement benefits he has received if he should die
after retiring.
The three will be considered separately here. The analysis again will
be cast in terms of a $ I annual before-tax retirement benefit promise to
the employee.
THE ANNrAI. RETIREMFNT hENEFIT
l)epcnding on the aniount the employee contributes to the pension
plan over the years, either of two tax rules appltes to his retirement
benefits.If the aggregate amount of his contributions is less than the
total benefits he expects to receive during the first three years of retire-
rnent. the full amount of each receipt is tax-free until those contribu-
tions have been recouped. All subsequent payments arc taxable in their
entirety at regular personal income rates.
If the aggregate contributions exceed three years' worth of retire-
nient benefits, the "life-expectancy" tax rule applies. Under that alterna-
tive, a portion of each benefit receipt is considered tax-free regardless
of how long the employee lives to collect his pension. 'fhe relevant
portion is determined as follows:The maximum postretirement death
benefit payable under the plan is divided by the amount of the annual
retirement benefit due. The result denotes the number ofyears it takes
to "earn out" that benefitto reduce it to zerogiven thatevery dol-
lar of pension received automatically diminishesthe prospective death
benefit by $1. This figure is then rounded offto the nearest integer and
an adjustment percentage obtained by entering Table III of IRS regula-
tion 1.72-9 under the indicated number ofyears. This adjustment per-
centage is applied to the aggregate amount of the employee's lifetime
contributions to the pension plan in orderto reduce that total as the basis
2This is the procedure referred to in fooInot 30of Chapter 2.
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for calculating the tax-free percentage accordingto the "life-expectancy"
rule.
To illustrate: assume that an executive,now age 50, is required to
contribute $5,000 per year to his firm's pension planand is promised
thereunder an annual retirement benefit of $20,000.By age 65, he will
have contrbuted S'75,00() to the plan. Since he standsto receive only
$60,000 in benefits during the first threeyears of his retirement, the
life-expectancy tax rule applies.Suppose, further, that the $75,000 in
contributions will accumulate, at the rate of interest specified inthe
pension agreement,1 to $90,000 b' age 65 if all fifteenpayments are
made. This amount then is the maximum postretirement death benefit
payable under the plan and is the pertinent figure forour computations.





Rounding this off to five years and entering the designated IRS table
for retirement at age 65 and a five-year recoupment period, the "ad-
justment factor" turns out to he 7 per cent. This means that the re-
mainder, i.e.. 93 per cent, of the executive's aggregate (unaccunmiated)
contributions of $75,000 are the basis for determining the tax-free
portion of his annual pension benefit. Because tile IRS also specifies that
fifteen years is the average life expectancy for a man age 65, the as-
sumption for tax purposes isthat our executive stands to receive a




By way of general notation, then, we may express the after-tax
present value to a man age x of a $1 per year before-taxretirement
benefit promise under a contributory pension plan as
If his contributions amounted to$2,000 per year instead, the total would
come to S30,000 1w age 65. Thus the alternative taxtreatment would take ef-
fect, all $20,000 of the first pension receipt and $10,000of the second being
tax-free.
This rate will he assumed here to he equal to 212 per cent.The rates for most
pension plans are in tact very close to this figure.
or .232, of each annual payment will be considered304
PJTRB = (I - i) (:) (v )
A1'I'ENI)IX1)
-F (1 - 13)(7) +(I- (:)
where tielThctivc tax rate on first year'sbenefit.
12cfIective tax rate on secondyear's benefit,
= eflective tax rate onthird year's benefit,
14 = eflective tax rate onfourth and subsequent years' benefits.
These arc cicterniined byobtaining the appropriate tax-free portions
fi-orn the procedures describedabove an(l calculating the regular per-
sonal income tax levies onthe remainder.lii the case of thcl!fC-
expectaflc\' rule. of course, t' (1
If both numerator anddenominator of each term on the right-hand
side of the equation arcmultiplied by r, and the symbols D. and N.
are introduced asabove, this standard formula reduces to
/D66
PVRB = (1 -t1) ()
H- (1 -12)
.1
+ (1 - 13) (') + (i - 14) (:)
or, for a life-expectancyrule situation,
PVRB(I - 1)
which, except for the value for i which will pertain, is the sameresult
as for a noncontributory pension.
POSTRErIREMENT 1)EATI! BENEFITS
If the annual contributions to the pension plan by the employee per
dollar of before-tax retirement benefit are K, and theyaccumulate
interest at a rate i under the terms of the plan, a man now age xwill
have amassed, at age 65, a sum equal to
K(l +
)65+ K(l + + K(l -f-.)65+2)
± '' + K( I-F i) =MDB.APPFNDX D 305
As indicated in the preceding section, this fiturerepresents the maxi-




to denote the accumulated value of a series of n paymentsas of the
end of the izth period, we have: i4DB= KS:Every dollar of pen-
sion benefit received in retirement then reduces the amount of the
prospective payment to the estate until the entire sum is recouped, at
which time the death settlement provision ceases. Thus, if the employee
should die after attaining age 65 and receiving the first annual install-
ment of his pension ($1 in the situation chosen as standard here) but be-
fore attaining age 66, his estate will be paid the amount: (KS;) -
If he dies the following 'car, the payment will he (KS;:) -- 2. and
so on. A portion of any such payments----that amount deemed by the
IRS to consist simply of a return of the employee's contributionsis
taxed at whatever estate tax rates apply and the remainderthe interest
earnings imputed to those contributionsis taxed asa long-term
capital gain. On the assumption suggested in Chapter 2. that 25 per cent
is a reasonable approximation of over-all effective estate tax rates for
executives, the division of these death benefits into the two components
is a matter of indifference to the present calculations. A 25 per cent
rate is taken to apply to both portions and therefore to the total, what-
ever its breakdown.
Since the probability that an employee, now age .i, will die during
the first year of his retirement is denoted by the ratio C1l:,"1,the after-
tax present value of that first possible posiretirement death benefitis
/(/65)
66x
--V PVDB(65) =(KS6s_ - l)(.75)
This benefit is discounted hack 66 - xyears on the conventionalactuarial
assumption that such payments arc made at the end of the yearin which
death occurs. The present value of the following year'sbenefit is
/1166)
67-
V PVDB(65) = (KSs5- 2)(.75)
Which was equal to S90,000 in the illustration citedabove.
See Appendix B.306 APPENDIX I)
The aggregate present valueofthe entire SeFICS ofthese Potential
receipts may therefore berepresented as
J"DI? = PJ'Dll(n)
n= 65
where ,n refers to the age atwhich the sum (KS;:,)is finally (Irawn
down to zero.
PRERETIREMENT DEAT it BENEFITS
If the executive should die beforereaching age 65, his estate stands
to receive theintercst_acciiniulated value of the contributions lie has
made up to that time. Thus.if our man, age x, should die within the
coming year, hevill have contributed an amount K and his estate will
receive K( 1.+- i)in returnagain assuming payment at the end of
the year.Ofthis amount, K is taxed at estate tax rates and iK at capital
gains rates. Continuing the assumptionthat the two percentages are
equal, a flat rateof25 per cent applies to the entire benefit in the
calculations here. After taxes, then. thebenefit payable upon death at
age x is
DB(x) = (.75)(K)(l + 1)
and its present value is
DBPV(x) = (.75)(K)(l L i)(r) (' ).
Ifthe employee dies the following year. he will have made two con-
tributions to the plan, and the resulting after-tax death benefit will be
DB(x -F 1) = (.75)(K)[(l.L f) ± (1 ±
)2](,75K)(S2).
This has a present value equal to
DBPV(x -. I) = (.75K)(S2)(v2) (': ')
In general, therefore,
DBPV(x + n) = (.75K)(S1i)(v"
41and, for the complete set of suchpayments,
DBPV>iDBPJ/(1 1- n).
This last is the total present value of thepreretirernent death benefit
feature.
THE CONTRIBUTIONS
The employee's obligation to contribute to thefinancing of the
pension plan, of course, represents to him a negativepresent value that
must be subtracted from the aggregate value of the indicated hcncfits in
order to obtain the appropriate net figure for the whole package. Fora
man now age .v, that negative present value can be expressed as
NKPVK(')+Kv(')+KV2(±)+ +Kv64(9).
Each term is the product of the probability that he will live to make
the required contribution and the discounted amount of that contribu-
(ion. This expression ultimately reduces to
N6s"
NKPV = I 1(K) \DI
following the notation introduced above.
THE TOTAL
The combined present value of the various benefit provisions of the
contributory pension. therefore, is simply: PV = PVRB + PVDB +
DBPV - NKPV. The necessary computations can be programmed
with little difficulty, given the appropriate mortality data and discount
rates.
1 lie individual Retirement 4 nnuity
The form of individual annuity chosen as the executive's market alterna-
tive to both types of pension arrangements has two componentbenefit
provisions:the retirement benefititself; and a preretirenient death
benefit. Their tax treatment generally resembles that of thecontributory
pension.
3073O ,P I'i N L)IX n
itIE RE !LRiiFNU lONER!
The annual retilelilcIlt l'cltLiLitu hLglll1tg- 65LiId cOFItlffljC br
the life of the employee .Ac cortlitig to s' tIt Portion 01each
receipt represented by the ratio of total premiums paid to total benefit5
anticipated is exemN from the f)ersOrlal income tax.111115,if the annual
prenhium quoted to a man, age x,for the purchase of a $1per Year
retirement annuity is denoted by P.. he will have to pay a total of
(F,) (65 - v) dollars in premiums through age 64. Given a fIfteen-year
life expectancy at age 65-----the IRS' figurehe is assumed to hare
fifteen SI annuity benefits in store. Therefore, the tax-free portion of
each such benefit will be









I'VB = (I t)I





TIlE PRERETIREMEN1 DEATH BENEFIT
If the prospective annuitant should die before reaching age 65. his
estatereceivesas a settlement the "cash surrender value" of the
contract as of the time of death. The applicable schedule of these cash
values is specified in the annuity agreement, and itis necessary to have
that schedule in order to perform thepresent value computations.
Vhen and if payment is made. the entire amount is taxed to the man's
estate at the normal rates-25 per cent by assumption hereartd, in ad-
dition. any excess over the aggregate premiums paidup to that time is
See Appendix K for the sehethite u',ed in the empirical portion of the cur-
rent study.
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taxed as a long-term capital gain. In deteiniining the latterassessment,
however, the e.tate tax on the relevant portionis deducted in defining
the tax base.
To illustrate:if a man who has paid ten $500 annual premiums
toward the purchase of a retirement annuity dies, and his estate receives
a $6,000 death benefit, the tax thereon is: (a) 25 per cent of S6.000. or
$1,500 in estate taxes and (b) 25 per cent of ($6,000S5.000) (.75),
or $187.50 in capital gains taxes. This conies to $1.687.50 in all. The
$250 in estate tax payable on the $1,000 dilTerence is excluded from
additional taxation.
In general, then, if I',is the annual premium required and CV.,
the cash value, 'death benefit payable at age .v-- n,the after-tax amount
of that benefit is
DB(.v ±ii) = (.75)(CV.,) - (.25)(.75)[(CV.) - (u -I )(/)].
Its present value is:
And the present value of the complete set of such payments is:
DBPV = DBPi"(x + n)
fl=0
THE ANNUITY AS A WHOLE
The total present value of a $1 per year individual retirement an-
nuity arrangement to a man, age .v, is therefore: P1"I'VB -- 1)BPV,
since no postretircment death benefits are included in the package
specified here.





The annual pavnieflts acorporation makes either to its own trust fund
or tolfl insurance conipallyin order to meet the anticipated cost of its
emploee pension plan are taxdeductible 1that plan satisfies the fol-
lowing requirenlentS
The plan is permanent.
The planisfor the exclusivebenefit of employees and their
beneficiaries.
The distribution of benefitsunder the plan is on the basis of an
explicit and predetermined formula.
Contributions by the corporation andbenefit payments do not
discriminate in favor of the firm's ollicers,shareholders, supervisory
employees, or highly paid employees.
The plan benefits either (a) 70 per centof all employees(b)
80 per cent of all eligible employees,provided at least 70 per cent of
all employees arc eligible, or (c) all employeeswithin a classification
which does not discriminate in favor ofhighly paid employees.
Deductions for such plans are limited to1 5 icent of the direct
annual payroll cost of the employees covered bthe plan. except where
a larger amount is required toprovide for the funding of pastservice
credits.
If the plan does not meet the indicated requirementsthe employer
company may deduct contrihutions to it onlyif the covered employees'
rights to the benefits promised are nonforf citable.Otherwise, no lax
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deduction at all is allowed, either at the timecontnbutions to the fund
are made or when retirement benefits to the employeesare ultimately
paid. See Internal Revenue Code, Sections 401 and 404as summarized
j0 Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the UnitedStates, The
Federal Tax System: Pacts (111(1 Problems (Washington:1964), pp.
120-121.
IAPPENDIX F
PRESENT VALUE AND CURRENT
EQUIVALENT OF A DEFERRED
COMPENSATiON CONTRACT
As was indicated in the text, the type of contract adopted here as a
standard for computational purposes is probably the most common
deferred compensation instrument in use today.It consists, as does a
contributory pension. of three benefit provisions:pOstretirernent de-
ferred payments to the executive, a preretirement death benefit, and a
postretiremcnt death benefit. It was possible to lIt just about every ar-
rangement actually confronted into the analytical mold developed for
this benefit package, even if the deferred payments were to be made
in shares of the corporation's stock rather than in cash. The methodology
for doing so is discussed in Chapter 5 and in Appendix H below. Both
discussions build on the basic framework to be outlined here.
The Deferred Payments to the Executive
The central feature of deferred compensation contracts is. of course,
the promise by the corporation to pay a specified sum to the executive
each year for a given number of years following his retirement. Unlike
the benefits under a pension plan. these payments are to cease after that
given period, even though the executive may continue to live. Since the
executive himself is not required to contribute any of his own funds to
the arrangement, the full amounts of any payments he eventually re-
ceives are taxable to him at regular personal income tax rates.
The after-tax present value to a man, now age .y. of the deferred pay-
ments he stands to receive may therefore he expressed as
312PVDP = (A)(l t) N+R)
D
where A denotes the annualbefore-tax payment inprospect, t the effec- tive personal tax rate thereon,and R the number ofyears for which
payments are to be made.
The Preretjrernent Deal/iBenefit
If the executive dies beforeage 65, a lump-sum settlement withhis
estate in the amount of theaggregate payments due if he had livedis
typically made. Thus his heirs wouldreceive (A)(R) dollars inthe
situation just depicted, all of whichis taxable at whateverestate tax
rates apply. By assumption here, 25per cent is taken to be a reason-
able estimate of the tatter. Thus theafter-tax present value of thepre-
retirement death benefits under thecontract for a man now agex
comes to
PVDBI =(.75AR)[()(v) +()v2) ±
The Post ret irernent Death Benefit
A similar settlement is made after retirementas well, if the executive
does not survive to claim all R payments promised him,The only
difference is that the amount of those installments already receivedis
dpducteg from the total contracted for in determining the size of the
death benefitwhich lgain is taxed in full at estate taxrates. If he
should die after attaining age 65 and receiving the first annualpayment,
but before reaching age 66, for example, his estate would be awarded
(A ) (R-- 1) dollars and would net, in the view here, 75 per cent of
that amount after taxes. If he died in the following year, the payment
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would be (A ) (R2) (k)llarS,ifl.I SO 011.the after-tax present value
of all such receipts asof age x is. then,
/ (16S\6(
PVI)B2 = (A)(R -l)(.75)
,)
(v (A)( R -. 2)(.75)()V67-x)
+ -}- (A)(.75) (d65+2)
(65
lx
By coflvCfltiOfl, theexecutive if he lives receiveshis deferred pay at the
beginning of each yearbut any death henelits areremitted at the end of
the year.
The present valueof the whole deferredcompensation package is, of
course, simplythe total of the threeexpressions developed above;
DCPV = PVDP +PVDBIPJ'D82.
The Current IncomeEquivalent
Given this present value,the stream of salary payments which are de-
fined here as the "after-taxcurrent income equivalent" of the arrange-
ment in question canbe computed. Those payments arespecified to be-
gin at age x and continuethrough age 64, being payaNe only to the
executive and therefore ofsufficient size that they connote the requisite
present value whendiscounted for mortality as well as for timedeferral.
In the case at hand, therefore,the relevant condition is that
(ATcEQ)[(i) + (v)L ...(4) (r64)]= DCPV
where A TCEQ denotes the necessaryannual salary payment. Rearrang-
ing and substituting the shorthandactuarial symbols used previously, we
find that
(D,)( DCPV)
ATCEQ = - -(N. - N64)
Were the executive's annual alter-tax salaryraised bthis amount, he
would be as well off, looking ahead at age x. ashe is in fact with the
deferred compensation arrangement described.APPENDIX G
EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTiONS
Section 218 of the Revenue Act of 1950 added "Section 130A: Em-
ployee Stock Options" to the Internal Revenue Code. It established
rules for the favorable tax treatment of what were termed "Restricted
Stock Options" granted to employees of corporations. In order to
qualify for that designation, the option was required to satisfy the fo1
lowing conditions:
I.It must have been granted after February 26, 1945, to an individual
for a reason connected with his employment.
It must have been granted by the employer corporation or its parent or
subsidiary to purchase stock of such corporations.
The option price must have been at least 85 per cent of the fair
market value of the opioned stock at the time the option was granted.
The option must be nontransferable except by will or by the laws of
descent and distribution.
It could be exercisable, during the lifetime of the optionee, only by
him.
The optionee, at the time the option was granted, could not have
owned stock possessing more than 10 per cent of the combined voting power
of all classes of stock of the employer corporation.
If the option met those requirements, and if the optionee: (1) was an
employee of the corporation granting the option or of its parent orsub-
sidiary at the time he exercised the optonor had been onewithin
three months beforehandand (2) did not dispose of the stockacquired
under the option until at least two years after thedate the option was
granted or until at least six months after the datethe option was ex-
ercised, he was eligible for the followingspecial tax treatment:
I.If the option price was 95 per cent or moreof the market value of the
stock at the time the option was granted, anygain from the subsequent sale
315S
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of the Ot)tloilcd stock was c0iisidrd a capital uaiii and taxed accordingis.
2.Ii instead the option price was between 85 and Y5 per cent of the
market value of the stock at then(lie op °''granted, any profit
realized LlPOfl SIIhSC(1UCnt ie'.alc was taxed asollosvs :(a)if. at the time
of the sale, the market price ol the stock was less than the market price
when the option was granted. the difference between the option price and
the sale price was treated as ordinary illcorfle at the time of the sale: (h) if
at the time of the sale, the marketprice of the stock was greater than the
market price when the option was granteu. the diflercuce between the
option price and the market price at the date of granting was treated as
ordinary income: the excess of sale Jricc over thit market price '\'as con-
sidered a capital gain.
The law also provided that, in the event of a stock spltt or a stock
dividend payable to the employer COrpOratR)I1S shareholders, the nuti.
ber of shares under option to the executive, and the option price, could
be adjusted to reflect that change. No deduction from taxable income
pursuant to either the granting or the cvcntttal exercise of the option
was allowed the corporation itself.
The revision of the Internal Revenue Code undertaken by Congress
in 1954 made several modifications in these rules. Chief atuong them
were:
I. The restriction as to those individuals who owned more than 10 per
cent of the employer corporation's stock was removed. It was specified.
however, that any options granted to such lO had to he issued at a price
not less than lIt) per cent of the niarket price on the date of granting ii
they were to qualify as "Restricted" stock options.
.Variable-price options were sanctioned .Ac cording to this provision, it
became possible to reduce the price of an option previous)' granted under
certain conditions ifitturtied out that the market price of the optioned
stock declined subsequent to the granting of the option and the new, lower
price persisted for a significant period of time.
. A limit of ten years was placed on the term of a single option.
The rest of theI 95() legislation was retained substantially intact, and
the entire set of regulations became Section 42 Irather than Section
I 30A of the Revenue Code.
In1 964, however, a major change in the relevant statutes occurred.APPENDIX G 317
A much less favorablejew of the privileges that should beassociated
with the Option WaS adopted by Congress, and theattractiveness of that
device diminished noticeably. The revised legislation(now Sections
42 1-425 of the Revenue Code) specified that, in order foran option
to he awarded special tax treatment under the new designation "Quali-
fled Stock Option":
I. The option price must equal or exceed the market value of thestock
involved at the time the option is granted.
The option must he exercised within five yearsofthe date of its
granting.
The sharesofstock acquired under the option must not he resold
within three years of the date it is exercised.
The option must he granted pursuant to a plan which specifies the
number of shares ol stock to he issued and the employees or class of em-
plovees who are to receive the options. This plan must he approved by the
shareholders ot the corporation within twelve monthsofits adoption and
cannot extend for more than ten years.
The option price cannot he reduced in the face of declining stock
market conditions nor can the option. by its terms, he exercisable while
there is outstanding an option which was granted to the same employee at
an earlier time.
The optionee, immediately before the option is granted, must not own
stock representing more than 5 per centofthe voting power or value of
all classesof stock ofthe issuing corporation (up to tO per cent in the case
of certain specified small businesses).
If these conditions are met, the difference between the market price
of the stock acquired under option at the time itis eventually resold
and the original option price is considered to be a long-term capital
gain and is taxed accordingly.
If instead the optionce disposes of the stock less than three years
but more than six months after exercise, the spread between the option
price and the market price on the date ofexercise istaxed as ordinary
income at the time the stock is sold. The difference between the niarket
price at the time of the sale and that at the time of exercise is taxed as a
capital gain.
Finally, if the stock acquired is resold within six months ofexercise,
any profits are taxable in full as ordinaryincome.
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Despite these rather substantialchanges in the tax treatment tii Options
the procedures describedin Chapter 4 nI the text for measuring the corn-
pensatOry valueofand coflstructing "current inComeeqiiivaleiits' for
options granted before1964 can be applied directly to those issued un-
(icr the new legislation aswell. It is true that. asaresult of that legisla-
tion, executives are likely toenjoy somewhat morefl1o(leSt Option profits
in the future than theyhave in the past. hut the basic character of the
instrument has not beenaltered. and our approach toits valuation
should require rio importantadjustments.
For example. the factthat the niaximuin term of the option has been
shortened to five years and the minimumoption price raised to 100 per
cent of market on thedate of granting merelimplies that these param-
eters will now (leteruhinethe duration and magnitude ol the executive's
stock option current equivalentinstead of the ten-year. 95 per cent
combination most frequently encounteredprior toI Y64. Similarly, the
restriction that employees who ownstock representing more than 5
per cent of the voting power orvalue of all classes of stock of the em-
ployer corporation cannot nowqualify for favorable tax treatment on
any options they aregranted simply means that a slightly smaller nurn-
her of executives may end upreceiving such options in the years to
come than might otherwisehave been the case. There is, however, no
reason to view those whodo still qualify and differently than we have in
the past.
The one provision of the new tax lawwhich might suggest a revision
of our valuation procedures is that whichspecifies a holding period of
three years from the date of exercise of an option as arequirement for
capital gains tax treatnient of any profits realized uponresale of the
shares thus acquired. It was argued in Chapter 4 thatunder the original
stock option legislation the compensation inìplicitin the optionee'S op-
portunity to 1urchase shares of stock at a discount fromthe prevailing
market price could he measured very precisely h' the SiZeof that dis-
count at the time it was claimed. i.e., on the date ofthe Options exercise.
From that point Ofl the optionee stood in the same position asany in-
vestor who might have purchased a like number ofshares on the openAPPENDIX C 319
market; the only diflerence between his opportunities and everyone
else's was the initial purchase discount itself. Under those conditions,
the gap between option price and market price at exercise completely
defined the optionee's net market advantage and supplied us with an ac-
curate index of the compensation he obtained from his option.
According to the rules currently iii effect, however, the executive who
exercises an option is subject to a constraint which is not imposed on
other investors: he must wait a full three years before reselling the shares
he has purchased in order to avoid having his profits taxed as ordinary
income. The question therefore arises as to whether there should he
some downward adjustment in our appraisal of the value of that option
to reflect this requirement. The position taken here is that the indicated
constraint is more apparent than real and that no such adjustment is
necessary, since the optionce's market activities are not inpractice
limited by the additional holding period per se and he is not put at any
meaningful disadvantage by it.
For one thing, most executives retain the shares acquired pursuant
to the exercise of stock options in their portfoliosfor a substantial
period of time, even in the absence of formal sanctions for not doing so)
They seem to consider an option a convenient vehicle forobtaining on
favorable terms a long-run ownership interest in their firms ratherthan
a speculative opportunity torealize quick profits. Few of them are there-
fore likely in practice to feel themselves differentially "lockedin" to the
shares thus purchased even in the face of a three-yearwaiting period.
It may well be. of course, that thoseshares simply take the place of
some the optionce wouldotherwise have acquired in the normal course
of affairs, and that on balance his aggregateholdings of the stock of his
employer are not increased over time.That is quite a different issue.
however, and one which deserves to betreated on its own merits. The
fact remains that executives have not inthe past typically resold optioned
stock for several years, even though theycould have done so without a
tax penalty.2
For evidence on this point, see: GeorgeE. Lent and John A. Menge. "The
Importance of Restricted Stock Optionsin Executive Compensation." Mwnage
ment Record, June 1962.
2Clearly, other types of implicit orinformal sanctions threatened by the
organizations to which such executivesbelong may, in part at least accountforr
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There is also evidence that, in general. top corporate executives main-
lain a fairly sizeable ownership inLet estin theiruspcctive Ilrmsapart
from any shares acquired through the exercise of stock Options, Thus, if
an optionce should decide toliquidate a portion of his holdings in order
to free funds for consumption orother investments, he can almost cer-
tainly do so by selling ofT shares which were purchased in the normal
manner and which have beenheld long enough to qualify for capital
gains tax treatment. In this manner, optioned stock iseffectively in-
sulated from the tax penalties of short-term trading.
Both of these arguments are, of course, empirical. The contention is
that a long holding period requirement is not a real Constraint for the
great majority of executives who arc granted options because thc' can
and will ordinarily hold for several years anyway. Nonetheless, for
certain individuals this will notor wOttl(l not by preferencebe true,
and in their case the worth of the option will be somewhat overstated by
utilizing the pre- I 964 valuation procedures and current income equiva-
lent format for options granted thereafter. Even for some of these in-
dividuals, however, there is a way out which still preserves the validity
of the position taken here. If the optionees problem is only one of
liquidity, he need not accept a tax penalty in order to raise funds. lie
can simply borrow against the value of his stock and repay the loan later
by liquidating his holdings after the three-year period expires. It is only
in situations where the optionee would, but for tax considerations, dis-
pose of the shares he has acquired within three years because he an-
ticipates a decline in price or perceives a more favorable alternative in-
vestment opportunity that he does in fact find himself at a disadvantage
vis-à-vis the market.4 As was suggested above. this problem should not
this phenomenon. Thus, the executive might hesitate to dispose of shareshe
has acquired under option for fear of having thataction interpreted by his
superiors or by the firm's shareholders as an expression of his lack of confidetice
in its future prospects.
And, as such, clearly require more (locltInentatlon than they have been given
here,ifthey are actually to heusedas a basis for valuation.
1 Itisworth noting that, were it possible for top corporate executivesto ,celI
shortshares of their firms' stock, the adverse tax consequences associated even
with these situations could be circumvented. Thus the optionee would, instead
ofselling off stock acquired under option, go shortiiian equal number of
shares at what seemed to him the opportune tune. lie woitlil then cover that
short sale with the proceeds of the sale of the optioned shares as soon as they
were eligible for capital gains tax treatment. Unfortunatelyfor its,that is-APPENDIX G 321
arise frequently. When applied to executive stock options issued under
the new tax law, therefore, the techniques developed in Chapter 4 will
no titore than slightly overstate their ''true" value.
the Senior officers and directors of large publicly held corporations arc pro
hihited by the SEC from engaging in SLICk activities (Securities and Exchange
Aci,c(ion).APPENDIX H
PRESENT VALUE AND CURRENT
EQUiVALENTS OF OTHER
COMPENSATiON ARRANGEMENTS
Deferred Stock Hon uses
The analytical framework for measuring the compensatory value of
a postretirenlent deferred stock bonus arrangement is essentially the
same as that developed for cash deferred pay contracts. The benefit
structures and tax treatment of the two instruments arc virtually identi-
cal, the only difference being the form in which benefits are ultimately
transniitted. Thus a deferred stock bonus provides for:(1) a series
of annual payments to the employee in retirement, each consisting of a
specified number of shares of the employer corporation's common stock;
The immediate transferral of all the shares set aside under that ar-
rangenlent to the cmployee's estate if he dies prior to retirement; and
an immediate settlement with the estate in the amount of the re-
maining installments due if the employee dies after retiring but before
enjoying the full series of annual payments designated.
The shares received are taxed to the employee at regular personal
income tax rates or to his estate at the applicable estate tax rates--in
both cases according to the market value of those shares at the time of
receipt.The one peculiarity of the valuation procedure required for such
an arrangement is the necessity to make a new appraisal of the worth
of the benefit package periodically as stock Prices change. even if no
additional shares are allotted to it.
THE A'JNUAI. RETIREMENT I'AYMENTS
If an executive, age .v. is promised a deferred stock l)oflUS consisting
of a series of R annual payments of K shares each, to begin upon his
retirement at age 65, and if the current market price of those shares is
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IPVRP(x) = (K)(F)(l - 1) [(:)(v65)()(v)
PVRP(x + 1) = (K)(P.+i - P)(l -t)
(N65N6SfR)
P dollars each, the after-tax present value of the prospectivepayments
max' be written as
or, more conveniently,
PVRP(x) = (K)(P)(l-t)(Ar6'65R)
where t denotes the over-all effective personal tax rate associated with
an annual income of size (K) (Ps) .j
If, by the time the executive reaches age x + 1, the market price of
the shares involved has changed, itis necessary to adjust our estimate
of the value of his deferred bonus to reflect this change in his circum-
stances. Thus we have
This represents the after-tax present value as of age x + 1 of the in-
crease (or decrease) in the worth of the bonus agreementoccasioned by
the stock price rise (or fall) experienced during the preceding year. The
notationt refers to the effective personal tax rate on the increment.
This procedure is then repeated every year until the man retires, the
result being a series of present value computations for each deferred
bonus observed.2
PRERETIREMENT DEATH BENEFITS
Assuming 25 per cent to be a fair approximation of therelevant
estate tax levy for executives, the presentvalue as of age x of the pre-
1As indicated in the discussion of these instrumentsin Chapter 5. footnote II.
5 per cent per annum is deemed the ippropriate discount ratefor purposes of
calculating present values. Therefore, the symbolin the equations above is
defined as (1/1.05) rather than the (1/1.025) figureused for pension and cash
deferred compensation arrangements.
2As noted in the text in connection with stockoption valuation, the change
in stock price could he recorded every month or everyquarter if a more fre-
quent appraisal and revision of the worthof the particular arrangement were
considered desirable. Since the analysis throughoutthe present study has been





retirement death benefitspayable under the arrangement described
al)u\4is
PVDBICv) = (.75)(K)(1')(R) (r)
Except for the substitution ofthe product (K) (Pr) for the annual cash
payment A. this is aduplicate of the expression derived in Appendix F
for a regular deferredcompensation contract.
Every year in which themarket price of the stock changes, then, the













PVDBI(x + ii)(.75)(K)(Px±n - pi)(R)
( " Ix-+ n /
forI ,(64 -x).
POSTRETIREMENT DEATH BENEFITS
A similar analysis applies to the postretirement deathbenefits. If the
executive, now age x, should die during the first year of hisretirement.
his estate stands to receive the (K) (R - 1) shares of stockthat will
not yet have been distributed to him b' the corporationin annual de-
ferred bonus payments. Given a current per-share stock priceof P.
that death benefitis estimated to have a before-tax value equal to
(Pf) (K) (R - 1) dollars and therefore implies an after-taxpresent
value as of ae x of
(.75)(P)(K)(R - I)(()(i,6).If he dies the following year, theresulting death settlement willcon-
sist of (K)(R2) shares having apresent value now of
2) () (,67X)
And, for the whole series of suchprospective payments, we have
PVDB2(x) = (.75)(P)(K)(R - ii)(d6;+n)(vSS_x+n)
Each time stock prices rise or fall, the change in thispresent value is
determined as before. Thus,









for eachIin(64 - x). The increment is evaluated in every in-
stance as of the year it occurs.
THE TOTAL PACKAGE
The aggregate after-tax present value of the deferred stock bonus
at the time it is established is, then,
PVDSB(x) = PVRP(x) + PVDBI(x) + PVDB2(x).
The total change therein in each subsequent year is
XPVDSB(x + n) = FVRP(x +it)+ XPVDB1 (x + n)+LXPVDB2(X ± n),
which must be computed through age 64 for the executive in question.
THE CURRENT EQUIVALENT
The stream of annual after-tax salary payments beginning at age x,
continuing up to and including age 64, and having a present value as
of age x equal to PVDSB(x) is the first element in the "current income
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equivalentof the deferred bonus.Tluis, where .4 iC IQ( v)I',th [1
essarv annual payment,
r/l\ n\ 1
PVDSB(x) = [ATC'EQ(x)]W) /)
(v)
defines the relevant equality.Rearranging:
IPVDSB(.v)1(D )
ATCEQ(x) = - (N - N)
And, in each subsequent year,the appropriate increment to that stream
of payments is
[SPVDSB(X -i- )
ATCEQ(X- n) = -
As a result, the total in anygiven year for the deferred stock bonus
which was initially established at age .v comesto
ATCEQ(x + n) = ATCEQ(x) ± ATCEQ(x + m)].
1?J 1
The current equivalents foradditional bonuses of this type can then
simply he added to this figure toarrive at an aggregate which reflects not
only the initial value of each hut anylater changes in that value.
Profit-Sharing Plans
A corporate profit-sharing plan whichprovides thatthe fundsal-
located to it be invested in shares of the firm's commonstock and those
shares distributed to the employee immediately uponhis retirement is
simply a special case of a deferred stock bonusand may be analyzed in
a similar manner. The onlybenefits payable under such an arrange-
ment are the indicated retirement distributionand a preretirenleflt death
benefit which specifics that the shares credited o theeniployces account
be awarded to his estate if he should die before attaining age65. Both
are taxable on the basis of the market valueof the shares involved on
the date they are distributed, the retirement payment atthe capital
gains tax rate and the death benefit at estate tax rates. Aswith a deferred
stock bonus, it is necessary to keep track of changes over timein stockAPPENDIX H 327
prices in order to update the value of thearrangement and ensurc that
its current income equivalent adequately reflects that value.
THE RETIREMENT BENEFIF
An employee now age x who has credited to his profit-sharingaccount
in the current year M shares of the employer corporation'scommon
stock having a market price equal to P: dollars per share has in prospect
a lump-sum retirement benefit of (M) (Pr) dollars. The after-tax present
value of that benefit is therefore
PVRB(x) = (.75)(M)(F)(5)(v65_X)
where again in this case, v = (1l .05). Ii, over the following year, the
market price of the shares changes, the employee will have experienced






The benefit format and present value of these payments are simply
duplicates of those applicable to deferred stock bonuses. Thus
and
PVDB(x + n) = (.75)(M)(P+Pi)
for the yearly present value increments.S
325 APPENDIX LI
TilE i'ACKA(;EANI) ItS CtRREN1 I:QV1A1. ENT
The combined presentvalueofthe twoheuetItsisI'V( x)
1' VRB (.i-)-PI'I)B(x )and the annual change in that value ,!> V(v--z)
-I'VRB ( + ii ) +'/)J(-}_ n ) .Following our previousflota-




ATCEQ(.vii) = ATCEQ(x)- ATCEQ(x-i)1
where
FPV(x + fl!(D.:j)
\ATCEQ(x --j) = --
A profit-sharing plan under which benefits were payable in cash instead
would he analyzed in the same way, the only dilTereuce being that
adjustments for changes in stock prices would, of course, be unneces-
Sarv.
Savings Plaiis
Since the typical corporate 'savings plan" or "thrift plan" closely re-
sembles a profit-sharing arrangement, the framework for its valuation
is almost identical. The only new clement is the presence of contribu-
tions to the plan by the employee, whose value must be deducted in
arriving at the relevant net present value.
TIlE RETIREMENT BENEFIT
A savings plan commonly specifics that the total of the employee's
and the corporation's contributions, along with the accumulated in-
vestment income earned on them, be distributed to the employee in a
lump suni upon his retirement. The capita! gains tax applies to tileCXCCSS
of such distributions over the aggregate contributions by the employee.
Therefore, if the firm adds a dollars to the man's savings planaccount
for every dollar he contributes eachs'car, tile total prospective retire-
ment benefit which results from a contribution of size K out of currentAPPENDIx H
salary by an employee now age x is (K)(1 -F- a). After taxes, this im-
plies a future receipt of
K(1 + a) - (.25)(aK)=K(l ±.75a)
having a present value, as of age x, equal to
PVRB(x)= (K)(l -.75a) ()(v)
adopting the usual notation.
If, then, each dollar placed in the savings plan in that year is invested
so asto have acapital valueincluding the reinvestment of an''
dividend or interest inconieequal to I,dollars at the end of the
year, the present value of the anticipated retirement benefit must be
revised to reflect this change. Accordingly, the employee would, as of
age x -1--1,expecttoreceive upon retirement(Jr .1)(K)( 1 + a)
dollars before taxes as a result of his participation in the plan during
the previous year. 01 this amount. K dollars will be tax-free, and the
new prospective after-tax benefit comes to
(I.t)(K)(l ± a) - (.25)[(1+i)(K)(l -- K]
=K[l -F- (.75)(Ii)(l -Fa)1.
This represents an increase of
K[l+ (.75)(J+i)(l + ii)] -K[l-F- (.75)(a)]
=(.75)(K)[(tr4i)(K)(l -F- a) - a]
pursuant to the year's investmentexperience. The after-taxpresent
value of that increment is
PVRB(x =(.75)(K)[(ii)(l + a) - a] ()(v)
If, in the following year. each dollarof capital value at the beginning of
the year becomes dollars at the end, the before-taxretirement
benefit rises to (I:) (I) (K) (I + a). After taxesit is
(L+2)(ti)(K)(l -a) - (.25)1(L±2)(1xI)(K)(1 -F-a) -
K 14-(.75)(J2)(1.-l)(I +330 APPENDIX H
and the increment is
K 1 + (.75)(1+2)(Li)(l + a)]K[ I ± (.75)(L +)( Ia)]
= (.75)(K)(1.i)(1(1)(Ll2 - 1)
with an after-tax presentvalue of
PVRB(x + 2) = (.75)(K)(J+i)(I+a)(1+2 -I)(I? ) (6.t2)
+ 2
In general, then,
PVRB(x + n) = (.75)(K)(l +a)(Ltn - I)(i+)(,65x_n)ll(I)
l.c-fn 1=1
for all 2n(64 - x).
IRERETIRENIENT DEATH BENEFITS
Should the employee diebefore attaining age 65, the usual arrange-
ment provides that his estatereceives the then-accumulated value of both
his and the firm's contributions tothe plan. As in the case of a con-
tributory pension, the portionof that receipt which consists of a return
of the man's own contributionsis taxed to the estate at the regular estate
tax rates and the rest as along-term capital gain. By conventionhere, of
course. this implies a25 per cent rate for bothportions and therefore
for the total.
Thus, the amount of the prospectivedeath benefit, as perceived at
age x, is K( 1 ± a) dollarsand its after-tax present value is
PVDB(x) = (.75)(K)(l + a) [(f) (i')--() (v)
+...()
(.65)]
As a result of the investment incomecredited to the account during the
first year. the potential benefit increases to(!) (K) (I +a)dollars,
a gain of (1,- I ) (K) (1 + a) overthe initial figure and anaddi-
tional after-tax present value of
64 -x
PVDB(x ± 1) = (.75)(I+i - l)(K)(I + a)( (v').
i\lx+1/
See Appendix D.APPENDIX H
In general
PJ'DB(xn) = (.75)(Lnl)(K)(l ± a)multiplied by
rni -164-x /
III(i± Ii( L i' JI1 \lx-jn
again for 2n(64 - x).
THE PACKAGE AND THE CURRENT EQUIVALENT
The rest of the story,then, follows exactly the pattern above.
Thus,PV(x) = PVRB(x) ± PVDB(.)- K and .PV(x +n)
PVRB(x + n) ± ..PVDB(x +n)for the present values, theem-
ployee's initial contribution, K, being subtracted in order to obtain the








The current equivalents of the benefits from the plan resulting from
subsequent years' participation by the employee can then simply he
added to these figures.
ATCEQ(x) -
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E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Com-
pan)'
Eastman Kodak Company





General Tire and Rubber Company
B. F. Goodrich Company








International H arvester Company
International Paper Company
lnternational Telephone and Tele-
graph Corporation
Jones and Laughlin Steel Corpora-
Lion
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
N at iorialDairy Products Corpora-
tion
North American Aviation, Incorpo-
rated
Phillips Petroleum Company
Procter and Gamble Company
Radio Corporation of America
Republic Steel Corporation
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
Shell Oil Company
Sinclair Oil Corpoiation





United States Rubber Company
United States Steel Corporation
\Vestinghouse Electric CorporationAPPENDIX J
SAMPLE SIZE EACH YEAR
Executive Rank, by Total After-Tax Compensation

















1940 49 48 44 45 44
1941 49 48 47 46 45
1942 49 49 47 45 46
1943 49 49 47 47 45
1944 50 50 48 47 46
1945 50 50 48 46 45
1946 50 49 49 47 44
1947 50 49 49 47 46
1948 50 50 50 48 43
1949 50 50 50 48 43
1950 50 50 49 49 46
1951 50 50 49 46 47
1952 50 50 47 47 46
1953 50 50 46 47 40
1954 50 50 47 45 41
1955 50 50 46 43 38
1956 50 48 46 42 31
1957 50 48 45 40 29
1958 50 49 40 38 29
1959 50 48 38 32 29
1960 50 46 33 32 24
1961 49 44 32 27 23
1962 48 40 30 24 19




Historical premiufli rate quotations wereobtained from two leading
insurance companies:Connecticut General Life Insurance Conipaflv and
The Travelers lnsurancc Company.The quotations represented the an-
nual premiums required forthe purchase of a nonparticipating straight
life annuity to begin at age 65 andproviding for a full cash refund (of
the interest-accumulated netpremiums) in the event of the death of the
prospective annuitant prior to that time.This is the individual annuit'
form specified in Chapter 2 asthe exceutive'S relevant market alterna-
tive to his employer's pension plan.
Even though the compensation datapresented throughout the study
cover the period1940 through1963,itwas necessaryto secure
premium rate information back to 1938in order to handle properly
those cases in which executives came underpension plans as early as
that year. Both insurance companieshave had several premium sched-
ulesineffect since then, indicating that forcompleteness separate
tabulations for each of the various subperiodsshould be compiled here.
In the interest of efficiency, however, thenumber of such subperiods
was arbitrarily restricted tothree: 1938 through 1948, 1949through
1958. and 1959 through 1963. Theseintervals roughly coincide with
those covered by the schedules olTered by the twofirms, which were
not entirely congruent, and giveexpression to the moie significant
changes in premium rates which have occurredsince1938. They
should, therefore, provide both a manageable and anacceptable repre-
sentation of the recent history of individual annuity costs.
334APPENDIX K
Each of the various premium rate (luotOtions was supplied in theform
of a schedule of eud-of-'carcash valuesand an accompanyiogan-
nuity conversion factor for age 65. For example, the following schedule
applied to annuity contracts sold from 1938 through 1948 byone of
the two insurance companies:
Number of YearsCash Value at End of Year















as a result of paving thirtyannual premiums of $100.
Annuity payable at age 65 per $1,000 of cash value =
$6.68 per month.
According to these quotations, then, a man who, at age57. contracted
to purchase a retirement annuityand paid eight annual premiums of
$100 each would, at age 65, stand to receive
(l) (6.68) = $5,558
per month, or a total of$66.69 in annuity benefits per year.since he
would have accumulated $832 in cashvalue by that time. Similarly.
had he begun to pay premiumswhen he was 35 years old, hisannual
benefit at age 65 would have beenr
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It is, of course, a simple matterto transform this schedule of cash
values into a schedule ofpremium rates per dollar of anmiitv hCflCfif
as a function of age atthe time premiufll paymentsbegin. Thus, if a
$100 annual premium startingat age 35 and continuingthrough age 64








where P( .v) denotes the
annual premium payable beginning at age xfor
the purchase of a $1 per yearannuity which is to start at age 65. and
C(65x) is the cash valuetabulated above for (65 - x)years' worth
of premium payments. Inthe example just cited, an ageof 35 at the
time of the initial premiumpayment implied a total of (65 -35), or





Because the computationsinvolved in arriving at the "currentincome
equivalent" of a pension make itconvenient to have the premium
quotations stated in this form, eachof the schedules provided by the
insurance companies was transformedaccordingly. lii the case of the
schedule above, the result was:
(Continued)
Age at Time Annual Premium Per Dollar






59 2.1471These arc, therefore, the relevant figures for the years 1938 through
1948 for this particular firm. A similar schedule was derived for the
other insurance company and the average of the two taken to be the
"typical" premium rate per dollar of retirement annuity confronted by
execulives during that period.
The procedure was then repeated for the intervals 1949-58 and
1959-63. The complete set of averaged premium rates which was ob-
tained is the following:
Age at Time
Annual Premium Per Dollar of Annuity
of Purchase 1938-48 1949-58 1959-63
64 $209453 $188166 $16.1630
63 8.01 26 7.8305 7.2040
62 4.7947 4.8864 4.6011
61 3.3821 3.5314 3.3708
60 2.5841 2.7526 2.6541
59 2.2784 2.2392 2.1550
58 1.7252 1.8844 1.8113
57 1.4666 1.6183 1.5545
56 1.2687 1.4149 1.3570
55 1.1157 1.2544 1.2006
54 0.9899 1.1206 1.0720
53 0.8856 1.0109 0.9668
52 0.7985 0.9182 0.8779
51 0.7248 0.8399 0.8019





Annual Prernitii-n Per Dollar





35 0.2350A schedule for ages 35 through 64 wassufficient to encompass all the
executives there was occasion to treatempirically, since most of them
were already quite high up intheir firms' hierarchy by the time pension
plans came into common use.
The second feature of individual annuity contractswhich is pertincnt
to the calculations is their provisionfor a refund of the potential an-
nuitant's premiums if he should (lie before attainingthe age at which his
annuity is to begin.2 That provision specifies that his estateshall receive
the amount of the gross premiums paid up to the timeof his death or
the cash value listed for that year, whichever isrcater.If an individual
who contracted to purchase an annuity under the termsof the first
schedule tabulated in this appendix died after making, say,three $100
annual premium payments, his estate would have received $300.since
the cash value indicated for year 3 is only S244. If hehad died after
making eight paymentshis estate would have received S832. which
exceeds the $800 in total gross premiums paid to that point. Ineffect.
the listed cash values represent the sum to which the individual's net
See Chapter 7.
2 No death benefits are payable after the annuity begins according to the form
of that instrument chosen here as a standard of comparison far the pension.Sec
Chapter 2.





Annual Preni iurn Per Dollar of Annujt
l93i 45 1 9S9_(
49 0.6063 0.7130 0.6796
48 0.5578 0.6614 0.6297
47 0.5154 0.6155 0.5852
46 0.4777 0.5748 0.5460
45 0.443 8 0.5380 0.5106
44 0.4135 0.5052 0.4795
43 0.3861 0,4753 0.4515
42 0.3613 0.4481 0.4259
41 0.3386 0.4234 0.4025
40 0.3180 0.4007 0.3811
39 0.2991 0.3799 0.3609
38 0.2817 0.3606 0,3423
37 0.2657 0.3428 0.3250
36 0.2508 0.3263 0.3091
35 0.2371 0.3109 0.2943APPFNDIX K 339
premiunlSflet of sales CommiSsions and administrative expensesac-
cumulate at the rate of interest guaranteed by the contract as of the end
of each SUCCeSSiVe year of premium payinelik. Thus, tue insurance
company agrees to refund at least the absolute amount of the policy-
holder's gross premiums in the event of his premature death, and will
pay the accumulated amount of his net premiums if that figureis
greater.
This feature, of course, has a significant value to an individual who
might contemplate the purchase of an annuity and is, as was outlined in
Appendix D, an important element in the determination of that particu-
lar contract which is as valuable as his pension. It is desirable to tabulate
the present value of the possible death benefits per dollar of prospective
annuity along with the applicable premium rates in order to eliminate
the need to recompute those present values each time a measurement of
the annuity's total present value is required. This cart be accomplished
by first converting the original schedule of cash values per S 100 annual
premium into one expressed in terms of cash value per dollar of antici-
pated annuity receipt, and then using those figures as the inputs to the
death benefit present value formula developed in Appendix D.
To illustrate: A man, age 57, who contracted to payeight 5100 an-
nual prenhiurns to the insurance company whose cash valueschedule is
listed above would, as part of the bargain.be assured that his estate
would receive the following schedule of deathbenefits depending on the
time of his death:
If Death Should



















a Assumes premiums arepaid at the
beginning of eachyear and that,if
death occurs, itisat some point sub-
sequent to that payment.
pr
If he paid instead the SI.499-4 annual plenhium reilu!red for a SI
annuity, [lie a.sctciatcd scheduleof deathKCIi1 WOOId lrrk like
Each of these valuesis simply (1.4994 100) of the corresponding
figures above. This, then, is therelevant tabulation for age 57 for a
schedule of per-dollar annuity present valuesfor this particular in-
surance company. As indicatedin Appendix 1). death benefits are tax-
free to the policyholder's estate if they represent merely a return of his
gross premiumsas would bethe case if he should die at any time
prior to attaining age 63 in the example herebut a capital gains tax
is assessed on any excess above the gross premiums. Thus, if our
$1 annuity purchaser should die when he is age 63. his estate would
receive,aftertaxes,(10.5559) -- (0.25)(i0.5559 - 10.4958) =
$10.5409, since $10.4958 represents the total amount of seven $14994
annual premiums. Similarly,if he should die (lie following year, his
estatewouldreceive(12.4750)(0.25) (12.4750 - 11.9952) =
$12.3630 net of taxes.
When this series of potential after-tax dcath benefits is discounted for
mortality and time deferral back to age 57 (as discussed in Appendix
D), the result is the aggregate present value of those l)aynlents per do!-
lar of retirement annuity purchasedthe form in which ii is most con-
venient to express the relationship for purpese s of "current equivalent"
calculations. Similar values can he obtained for each of the ages 35
through 64 at which executives might begin the purchase of an annuity,
and the outcome for the insurance company whose cash value schedule













340 APPENI)IX KWhen these figures and the corresponding ones for the years 1938--48
for the other insurance company are averaged, a composite scheduleof
death benefit present values for that period similar to the composite
premium rates derived earlierisobtained. When the process isre-





Present Value of Death Benefits
Per Dollar of Annuity
1938-48 1949-58 1959-63
64 $03381 $0.3038 $02609
63 0.3650 0.3567 0.3281
62 0.4118 0.4197 0.3952
61 0.4575 0.4777 0,4560
60 0.4964 0.5288 0.5098
59 0.5310 0.5711 0.5496
58 0.5571 0.6085 0.5849
57 0.5808 0.6388 0.6152
56 0.6020 0.6646 0.6421
55 0.6218 0.6866 0.6656
54 0.6376 0.7041 0.6849
53 0.6503 0.7196 0.7020
(Continued)
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Ae at Time of Present \'alue of Death












This schedule and the one listedabove, therefore, summarize the his-
torical data on indvidual annuitieswhich are relevant to the pension
current equivalent coniputatiOflS.
342 Ai'PFNDIX K
Present Value of 1)eatli ltcijetjts
Age at Time
of Initia!
Per l)llai ol An nuitv
1938-48 1949-58 1)59.-63 Premiuni Pavmeilt
52 0.6608 0.732! 071S8
5 i 0.6692 0.7428 0.7269
5t) 0.6753 0.7509 .735s
49 0.6795 0.7571 0.7422
48 06816 0.7614 0.7468
47 0.6825 0.7638 0.7492
46 0.6818 0.7647 0.7502
45 0.6795 0.7637 0.7495
44 0.6762 0.7619 0.7486
43 0.6718 0.7584 0.7464
42 0.66o5 0.7538 0.7428
4! 0.6601 0.7485 0.7381
40 0.6530 0.7420 0.7324
39 0.6453 0.7349 0.7250
38 0.6369 0.7268 0,7168
37 0.6281 0.7! 84 0.7081
36 0.6188 0.7093 0.6989
35 0.6092 0.6997 0.6893APPENDiX L
PROFESSIONAL INCOMES ANALYSiS
In Chapter 9. a comparison was made of the rate of growth since 1940
of the total after-tax compensation of top executives mid the after-tax
earnings of "successful" physicians, lawyers, and dentists. As a means
of estimating the likely impact of progressive personal income taxes on
the last three groups. the assumption was that their earnings in 1962
the most recent year for which data are availablewere of the same
order of magnitude as the before-tax salaries and bonuses received by
the executives in the sample studied. An assumption of this sort was
necessary because published information on professional incomes exists
only in the form of averages for the various occupational categories, and
it is therefore impossible to identify the earnings of just that upper end
of each which would seem to be the most logical focus for a comparison
with senior executives. The objective here is to test the effects on such
a comparison of somealternative income level choices.
The assumption made in Chapter 9 was that the before-tax earnings
of the most successful men in the highest-paid of the threeprofessions
in 1962, i.e., medicine, were equal to the average before-taxdirect cur-
rent remuneration received during recent yearsby top executives- This
implied a figure of $143,548 for physicians. The before-taxearnings of
lawyers and dentists were then set equal to $97,439and $99,984, re-
spectively, these figures being in the same proportion to$143,548 as the
reported averages for all lawyers and dentists werein 1962 to the aver-
age for all physicians. From thehistorical record of growth rates in
before-tax earnings for the three groups.their incomes were projected
back to1 940 and the relevant after-tax figuresobtained.
As alternatives, the following assumptionswill be tested here:
I. The before-tax earnings of the upperend ofall threeprofessions
in 1962 equal to $143,548.9
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2. The before-tax carilirigs of the 1oiie.t-pud of the 1I1FC---\\r
--set equal to $1 43.54)in 1962 and those ofhysicinantidentIsts
raised proportionately to $211 ,45() and $147,295.
Developments back to1 940maythen he reproduced on these as-
sumptions and new after-tax time series created. The results are sum-
marized in the attached table and compared with executives' after-tax
histories.






tndcr Asniiiptioii 1Above: -------- --------------
PhvsicIan.l.avcrsI)entj',tsPhvocian





1940 1.00 1.00 1.0(1 1.00 IOU 1410 lilU
1941 ((.94 0.86 0.94 0.91 0.86 0.93 0.9c
1942 1.03 0.85 0.97 0.1)8 ((.85 11.97 0.74
(943 1.1)9 1)8(1 1.02 I .1)1) ((.80 1.01 (L65
1944 1.20 1)85 I.2 1.09 0.85 I- II 0.70
I 945 1.29 0.88 1.14 1.15 0.88 1.14 0.69
1946 1.3$ (1.99 1.21 1.2$ 0.99 1.21 (1.80
1947 1.42 I.03 1.24 1.32 1.03 1.23 0.84
194$ 1.92 1.42 1.66 1.85 1.42 (.66 1.13
1949 1.97 1.41 1.6$ 1.9(1 1.41 1.6$ 1.19
195(1 2.05 1.46 .73 1.97 1.46 1.73 1.32
195 I 2.1 I 1.48 1.75 2.00 1.4$ 1.74 1.29
1952 - 1.40 - 1.4(1 I 33
1953- 1.44 - 1.44 -. 1.44
1954 - .64 - - 1.64 - 1.56
(955- 2.15
1956- - .- 217
957 - - - - 221)
958 - - -- 2.1(1
959 2.9(1 2.06 2.6)) 2.70 2.06 2.6(1 2.16
196(1 2.94 2.1)8 2.68 2.73 2.05 2 67 2.14
1961 3.01 2.21 2.79 2.79 2.21 2.7$ 2. 16
1962 3.13 2.24 2.95 2.8$ 2.24 2.94 2.1$
1963 - 2.16APPFNDIX L 345
As is evident. the COflClLIaOn reached in Chapter 9 thattop execu-
tives have not fared as well as the professions in terms ofrates of after-
tax earnings growth still holds. The gap nai rows the higliei thepretax
figures assumed for other occupations, but therange of estimates
specified encompasses a fairly broad range of possibilities and should
suffice for our purposes here.APPENDIX M
COMPENSATION COST ANALYSIS
The question as to the relationship between the cost to the employer
corporation of the various rewards in its executivepaypackage and the
cost of the "current inCome equivaleiits"proposed for those rewards
WOS raised at several points in thestudy. The answer to that question
for each of the major components ol the package is.given the ap-
propriate framework by whichto viewIlie conipe nsation transaction,
quite clear-cut. The objective of this appendix is to spell out such a
framework.
PCI1SIOJ1 Plans
Consider the case of an executive,flOWage x, who is promised K
dollars per year in retirement under his firm's pension plan.If we
assume initially that there are no corporate or personal income taxes
which assumption will very shortly he relaxedwe may express the
present value to him of that promise as
/ \r6ç
PVi' = (K)
where N and D, are the actuarial symbols defined in Appendix D and
employed in developing the present value formulas in most subsequent
appendixes. The annual cost to the corporation of providing the in-
dicated pension is simply the annual premium itmust pay for this
For convenience, the discussion will he cast in terms of a ,wncontrihutory
pension and its current income equivalent. Nothing essential to the analysic is
sacrificed by doing so. and the present value expressions necessary for the cost
comparisons are much less complicated than would be th' case for a con-
tributory arrangement. The arguments develoged and the conclusions reached
will, however, apply equally to the latter.
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executive to the insurance company from which ithas purchased its
group annuity contract.3 If that Premium is of size P1.per dollar of
pension, the total annual cost to the firm for theexecutive in question is
Cr = (K)(P),
which cost it will incur each year until theman retires.
Now, according to the reasoning suggested in Chapter 2, the "current
income equivaIentof an eniployee's pension is the increment to his an-
nual after-tax salary which would permit him to purchase an individual
retirement annuity having the same present value. In the absence of
taxes, of course, a straight life annuity of precisely K dollars to begin at
age 65 would be as valuable to our hypothetical executive as his pension,
since its present value would also be
PVA = (K)
as of age x.3 If we then let P.1 denote the annual premium charged by
an insurance company for a $1 annuity of this type, the total annual
premium that would be required of the executive beginning at age x
and continuing through age 64 is
CA = (K)(PA)
and a salary increase of the same amount would be an appropriate sub-
stitute for his pension; he could acquire the annuity with thatincrease
and be as well ofT in terms of present value.
The issue for our attention, therefore, is whether, givenindifference
from the executive's standpoint, the salaryincrease or the pension
2 Or, alternatively, the amount the firm must set aside on theexecutive's be-
half in its own pension fund ifit has chosen to manage that fund itself.
Again, for convenience and ease of comparison,the preretirement death
benefits payable under such an arrangement willbe ignored. The analysis should
be affected verylittle by this simplification, however, sincethe present value
of those prospective payments isinall cases quite small in relation to thatof
the retirement benefits themselves. Forexample. according to the mortality table
used in the empirical portion of the currentstudy. and assuming a 2per cent
discount rate, the present value to anexecutive, age 40. of a SI per year re-
tirement, benefit to begin at age 6$is 55.113. The present value ofthe pre-
retirement death benefits associatedwith an individual annuity contractof that
sizeis only about $0732. For a man, age50, the corresponding figures are
$6.74 and $0.735.348
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promise i: morecostly tO the coflipallY.Since bith cot have been put
in the form of anannual outlayextending OSCI the same future period,
the relevant conipariSOnis simply
Cr(K)(I'r)(K)(1') = C1.
Clearly, if !P .i.e.. lithe prerniufliScharged per dollar of proSpeC-
tive retirementbenefit arc the samefor group annuity contracts as for
individual 0nnuities.the cost to thecorporation of the current income
equivalent of eachof its employees pensionswill he equal to that of
the pension itself.
It is worth notingthat this assertionis completely independent of not
only the exeCutiVe'Sbut the firm's opportunitycosts. Whatever discount
rate is chosen forthe individual, thepresent value of the paymentsdue
under both hispension arniitsindividual annuity counterpartare
calculated using the samerate, which isbuilt into the actuarial symbols
Nr and D. in theformulation above andthus is neutral in its impact on
the comparisons.Similarly, if the costs tothe firm of the two alternatives
were expressed morefully as the preSeltvalues of the indicated series
of required annualoutlays, the relationshiPbetween those present values
would obviously be nothing morethan a restatenlent ofthat between the
annual figures themselves.This conclusion will he seento apply to sub-
sequent comparisons aswell, since the analyticalframework will be the
same in each case.
Now, because groupannuity premium rates aretypically lower than
those quoted for individualannuities, it would almostcertainly turn out
in practice that even ifasin the situation depictedtherewere no
corporate or personalincome taxes. it would heless expensive for the
business firm to providepensions for its employees than toaward them
salary increases of equivalentvalue. In other words, wewould expect
to find that
Pr = (I -
where 0 < a < I. If so, then,
Cr < CA,
since
(K)(P1.) = (K)(l - a) (PA) < (K)(P.i).
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Thus, our first move toward a more realistic description of the relevant
environment suggests that, for the corporation, the pension is the more
etuicien(' of the two alternatives proposed.
Introduction of the corporate income tax to the comparison leaves
this relationship unchanged. Both the firm's contributions to its pension
fund and any salary payments to its executives arc tax-deductible. Hence
the annual aftcr-tax cost of the pension becomes
(K)(l - a)(PA)(l - i)
where t. denotes the corporate tax rate. Similarly, the annual cost of
the salary equivalent is now
(K)(PA)(l - ta).
Therefore, the conclusion remains that C,' < C.1 as long as group an-
nuity premium rates---or funding obligationsarc less perdollar of
prospective benefit than those for individual annuitypolicies.
Consider next the impact of the personal income tax,assuming for
the moment that the effective rate for the employeein question is ex-
pected to be the same after retirement as before andthat both individual
annuity benefits and anpension receipts are taxable in full at that rate.
Under those conditions the present value tothe employee of his pension
now falls to
P Vp = (K)(!)(1 - tp)
where t,, is the applicable personal tax rate.On the other hand, a match-
ing decline in value is alsoassociated with the K-dollarindividual an-
nuity which was. in the absenceof taxes, as valuable tohim as the
indicated pension. Thus,
PV = (K)(5)(1 -- t)PVp.
Accordingly. an annual premiumof (P.4) (K) dollarswill still permit
the purchase from an insurancecompany of anannuity of the proper
size, and therefore (K) (I')continues to define theamount of the
"after-tax current incomeequivalent" at issue. Inorder to provide the
executive with that muchadditional take-home payeach year, however,350 APPFNI)IXNI
thecorporationwouldhavetoraisehisbufore-ta.vsalaij'
(K ) (I')(I - t, ) dollars, thereby incurringi net aniinii coSt ot
(K)(Pi )( I - t)
(1 - t)
This obviously would be rather substantially in excessof the cost of the
pension itself, since
(K)(P)( I -
Cp = (K)(l - (1)(I'4(l - t) <(I - i,
= CA.
The factorI(It,, ) represents. in effect, the tax advantage which re-
sults from the fact that employees need not, under present law, include
in their taxable income the contributions made ontheir behalf to
qualified corporate retirement plans by their employers. If such con-
tributions were taxableor ifit were poSSil)ie for the employee to opt
instead for a salary increase which would be considered tax-free by the
IRS as long as it were used for the purchase of an individual retirement
annuitto replace his pensionthe relationship between the cost to the
firm of the two alternatives would revert to that wherein the only dif-
ference was attributable to a difference in group annuity and individual
annuity premium rates.
The conclusion that the pension isless expensive than its current
equivalent holds, therefore, even under the assumption that the em-
ployee's tax rate in retirement is as high as that which he confronts
while still working. A more likely circumstance, of course, would be a
lower over-all effective rate past age 65, since the man's income is almost
certain to diminish when he retires. Nonetheless, if we let t. denote the
anticipated postretircmcnt personal tax rate, where tr < tp. we simply
substitute the term (1 - t) for (I - i) in the expressions above for
the present values of both the pension and the individual annuity, and
we establish OflCC again that
p171,= PVA,
since both are equal to
(K)(N65\DiTherefore, P and P1 are still the relevantannual pension and annuity
prerniunis, and the resulting cost comparison fromthe standpoint of the
firm remains
Cp = (K)(Pp)(lr)<(K)(PA)(l te)
= CA
(1-
where, as before, Pp(1 -. a) (P1).
Let us then remove the final constraint imposed on the analysis and
recognize that in fact the retirement benefits received underan in-
dividual annuity policy are taxed less heavily than those received under
a corporate pension plan. As indicated in Chapter 2, a portion of the
annuity benefits are considered by the IRS to constitute a return of the
policyholder's premiums and, as such, are exempt from tax. In particu-
lar, the fraction
F=
of each payment received by the annuitant in retirementvill be tax-
free.4 Accordingly, the present value, as of age x, of a K-dollar in-
dividual annuity is in reality
PVA = (K)
(N65)tI - t,(l - F)],
which is necessarily a somewhat larger present value than that implied
by the prospect of a K-dollar pension benefit. As a result, the corpora-
tion, in order to permit the employee concerned to obtain an adequate
replacement for that pension, need only raise his annual take-home pay
by an amount equal to the premiums on an individualannuity of size
(K)(1 - h),where
PVp = (K) (-) (I - t,) = (K) ()[i - t,(l - F)I(l - b) = PV
and, of course, 0 < b < 1. In short, a smallerannuity than that sug-
Thus,(p4)(65 - x)representstheaggregate premiumspeidollarof
prospective annuity which will be paid between age xand age 65 by the policy-
holder, arid fifteen years is specified by theIRS as his life expectancy at age 65,
i.e., the aggregate annuity payments he isexpected to receive under the contract.
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gested by the stIiIl)ler coniparisons above willsutlice to detine the pen-
510115 cuietil equivtheiit. Solving tar(I/: }. we find that
I -
(I-- b)- ,(l - F)
and the annual individual :innuitv premiumthe emplo\ee would have
to be able to meet out of any salaryincrease is just (K) ( P ) (I-- b)
The cost to the firm of providing that increasewould be
or
Substituting for (1 - b)
(lt)
1 - tr(l - F)
Clearly, even if F were equal to its maximumpossible value of unity
(the annuity benefits being completely tax-free ). the inequality would
hold, since we have established that t, < Any smaller F would then
This result may he interpreted as follows: The tax saving in retirement oc-
casioned by the employee's not having to pay taxes on benefits is
necessarily less than the tax disadvantage involved in raising his salary during
his active working life hs' enough to enable him to par the taxes thereon and
still end up wilh sufficient funds to purchase that annuity.
as compared with a pension cost of
(K)(P1)( I - a)( 1 - 1.).
Therefore. if
(K)(P.i)( I - b)( I - t)
(K)(P4)(I - a(l - t) < - t)
the pension will, after all, he less expensive than its current equivalent.
Assuming temporarily that a0. i.e.. that there is no difference be-
tween group annuity and individual annuity premium rates, we mar state
the necessary condition as
I b 1<-'p
- t < I - b.
(K)(l')(i -b)(l -t)
CA - (I -t)imply a larger value for tile quotient on the right-hand side of the
inequality and reinforce that relationship.
Finally, if we permit o to take on a positive value, the quctiuit be-
comes whether
(1 - i)(l - t) < 1b,
the answer to which is obvious, given that (Ii) < (1 -- b).
Our conclusion, therefore, is that under almost any conceivable set of
circumstances, the cost of the pension to the employer corporation will
be smaller than the cost of the salary increase which would provide the
executive with the same level of after-tax remuneration. Only if the exec-
utive were expecting a higher total annual income after retirement than
before, or if group annuity premium rates exceeded those quoted for
individual annuities, could this conclusion be reversed. Both situations,
of course, are extremely unlikely to occur in practice.5
Deferred Compensation
A similar story emerges from an examinationof the costs of deferred
compensation arrangements and their current equivalents.Consider an
executive, now age .v, who is promised K dollars per yearfor a total
of in years upon his retirement at age 65. If westart out once again as-
suming that neither personal nor corporate incometaxes are imposed,
the present value to him of that promise asof age x may be written as
PVDC = (K)\ D.
and the present value of the costof those payments to the firm as
= (K)(s _5j
The preretirement vs. postretirementincome issue does, however,illustrate
why it would he inappropriate for aflrm to attempt to minimize its compensa-
tion costs by paying only nominalsalaries and utilizing pensionbenefits as the
major component of (tie pay package.Even if its employees wouldaccept such
a strategy and thegovernment would sanctionitcorporate tax deductionsfor
pension lurid contributions arelimited by law to 15 per centof employee wage
costs), at some pointit would turn out thatprospective pension receipts ex-
ceeded current salary paymentsand the tax advantagewould disappear (in the
formulation above, this wouldimply tr> ta).
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'The notation N; and I) indicates that the discount rates built intothe
actuarial symbols may not he the same for the exceulive arid thecorpo_
ration and therefore that the prcent "a tue r'f exactly the same series
of payments may differ depending on which one is doing the evaluating
Thus the relevant definitions are
- =(-:Y
N65 - N65 +, + D66 ±
= = i (
I }T
- I)6s4--i
Ns -N5±= D5 .............- D5,,1_ i
where rrepresents the executive's opportunity cost and rthe cor-
poration's: Clearly, if r > re, then D < D1 and (N65- N65 <
(N6) --N65+,) ;i.e.,the present value of the cost of thearrangement
to the corporation is less than the present value of the reward it implies
for the executive.
Now, the "current income equivalent" of such a series ofpayments
is taken to be that increase in the executive's salary which, if main-
tained from age x through age 64, would have thesame present value




since, of course, the executive must remain aliveup to retirement in







As inthe case of pension plans, any deathbenefits payable under the
deferred compensation contract will be ignoredin order to simplify the analysis
Such a step will not affectour conclusions, however, since the present value of
those benefits would appear in 1)0th theexecutive's and the firm's appraisal of
the contract in question andexcept forthe same sort of effect of possible dif-
ferences in discount rates which willbe pinpointed in the discussion that fol-
lowswould thereby raise bothto the same extent.APPlNDIX M 355
The question, then, is whether the costto the firm of a salary increase





Substituting now for S and rearrangir1g, the issuereduces to
- N5) (/\T,5
(N. - A5)
>(N65 - N5 ,,,)
If the same discount rate applies to both the executive and thecorpora-
tion (Tr = re). it will be true for all I that N1= 1V, In that case, the
quotients on either side of this expression will be equal toone, and we
may con lude that C8 = C.
If, on the other hand, the corporation's opportunity cost exceeds that
of the cxecttive, it turns out that
(N - N65)(N6$ - N65+,,)
(N - N65)(N - N65+rn)
and therefore:
C> Ci-
which is, of course, what our intuition would lead us to expect. Thus,
if a firm has available to it better investment opportunities than do its
employees, it is not surprising to discover that, in effect, the advantage
to it of being able to defer a portion of their wages is greater than the
accompanying disadvantage that deferment entails for them. If, however,
the firm can do no better with the funds than can the employees in-
volved, neither party stands to gain through a deferred pay arrangement.
and the current equivalent of such a contract would, at least in the ab-
sence of taxes, he precisely as expensive as the contractitself.If the
firm cannot do as well, the current equivalent is cheaper. The consensus
would probably be that, in practice, the first of the three situationsis the
most likely.9
The difference in discount rates makes itself fell morestrongly the farther
in the future are the payments being considered. Thus, theratio of an N1 to the
corresponding N1 or D to D1 becomes smaller as i increases.
It is important to recognize in this connection that,in speaking of potential
investment returns, care must be taken to comparealternatives in which the356 Al'PENDiX NI
The presence of a corporate income tax does not alter these con-
Cinsions,!nCC I'OIIi aiinieihate salary payments and any evcntual outlays
for deferred compensation awards are tax-deductible at the time they
are made. Thus the present value, as of age x, ofthe net cost to the
firm of the deferred payments described above is
1\T6.
Ci = (K)(l - t)
k D





and a comparison of the two produces exactly the same result as in the




then C... > Cfr, the particular corporate tax rate levied being quite ir-
relevant.
The personal income taxis similarly neutral inits impact on the
analysis as long as the executive in question is subject to the same over-
all effective rate after retirement as before. Under those conditions the
present value to him, as of age .v. of a series of ,iz payments of K dollars
each beginning at age 65 is
/ JV6c - PVDC = (K)(l - t)
D)
where t;, represents the applicable personal tax rate. It would therefore




S = (K)(l--irç )-
rtks incurred are sinular.fliusacorporation niav indeed has c avtiiah1c op
portunities for employingits funds sv hich hold out the promise ofarather
higher rate of return than those etlectivelv open to its executives as individuals.
but such opportunities oiav also subject the firmto thesihilitof more
substantt:tl lossesifthes do not work out as pLniied. Outsif the corporation
has differetitiallv better invcimcnt prospectsithin givenrisk classescanWC
legitimately credititwith an advar.taee over its employees.APPENDI> M
PVDC(K)(1 -Ir)
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dollars in order to provide him withan equivalent reward. Beforetaxes, of course, this would mean a salaryincrease of S'/ (1t) dollars,
having a net cost to the employercorporation of
Cc = (S) t.) [(N.- Ns5)
(It) L Dc
This. conveniently, simplifies to
(PVDC)(D)
= (S)(l - t)(5)
as in the situation where there were no personal incometaxes. In effect,
the reduction in the size of the computed equivalentsalary increase
which results from taking into account the taxes inevitablydue on post-
retirement income is precisely offset by the requirement thatsufficient
before-tax salary be paid to enable the executive tomeet the taxes
thereon while still an active employee. The cost to the firm ofthe de-
ferred payments remains
= (K)(l -(N65 _N65rn)
and the relationship between the two costs continues to he as expressed
above.
If, however--as seems more likelythe executive's income falls when
he retires and therefore his personal tax rate in retirement is expected
to be lower than that applicable to his present salary. there is a clear
cost advantage to deferred compensation arrangements. Lettingt,.again
denote the relevant postretirement tax rate, we have
(N65 - No+,
for the after-tax present value to the executive of the deferred payments.
An after-tax salary increase of size
(N N65)
extending from age x through age 64 would be asvaluable. The neces-
sarv before-tax increase then is S";(I -tn),and the present value of
its cost to the corporation becomesrU
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(.S")(l-- - 15'65)
Cs = (1 - Ip)(I)x)
c
(K)(l lr)(I -(c)(Ns - N65)(Nos -i\'65us)
(N -JV6S)(I
This compares with a cost of
Cd.
(K)( I - t)(Nos --N+,n)
for the deferred payments, and leads to the conclusionthat if
(1!r)( N -- N)(No -N65 +ns)
(I --N5)
>(Ns
the cost of the current equivalent of those paymentsis greater than that
of the payments themselves. Accordingly, even inthe situation where
the corporation's and the executive's discount rates areidentical, it will
he true in the reduced expression that
1 ->1
1 -
as long as i. < r, and the currentequivalent scill be the more expen-
sive reward. The existence ofeitherof two conditions therefore is suf-
ficient to establish a preference for deferred compensation over anim-
mediate salary increase of comparable value: the firm has betterin-
vestment opporwnities than do its employees, or theincome of the
latter is expected to fall upon retirement. The probabilities certainly
seem to point in the direction of at least one ofthe two being fulfilled in
virtually every instance.'0
Stock Options
The conclusion in the case of stock options is no less precise, but the
analysis suggests there is rather more room for the adjustment of corn-
The preceding discussion applies as wellto deferred compensation plans
under which payments are to he made in the form of shares of the corpora-
tion's common stock.Thus, itmakes no difference to the arguments made
whether the value for K in the various formulas is actually specified by the
contract being considered oris estimated from stock price data. However the
figure is obtained, the current equivalent format is the same; any increments in
the value of the arrangement in subsequent years are treated separately as they
occur; and the comparisons indicated hold without qualification. See Chapter 5.APPENDIX M
pensation strategy to the circumstances of the individual employee. Con-
sider an executive who exercises a stock option for in shares at a time
when the market price of those sharcis equal to P,. Given an option
price of P, his before-tax profit is K(in) (P,, - P,). With a capital
gains tax rate equal to t, his after-tax reward comes to (K) (1
dollars. The cost of that transaction to the employer corporation is meas-
ured simply by the dilution in the shareholders' equity occasioned by the
sale of a portion of the ownership of the firm to the executive at a price
less than its actual valuein short, by the same total price differential,
K, which defines his before-tax reward. Since no deductions from taxable
income are allowed the firm in connection with the granting orsubse-
quent exercise of stock options, K also representstheafter-lax costto
it of that instrument.
Now, in order to have provided the executive with the samelevel of
remuneration, it would have been necessary toaward him a bonus of
(K) (1 - t,)/( I - t) dollars in the year ofexercise, where 1,,is the
personal tax rate he would be subject to onthat increment.1' The cost
of this alternative scheme would have been
= (1 - t)
given a corporate income tax rateoft.The question then is which of
the two costs is the larger,
or, simply
(I - i)(l - Ig)
< (lt)
As it turns out, the inequalitymay run either way,depending on the
tax rates applicable tothe particular situation.If we assume a 50 per-
cent corporate tax rateand adopt the 15 percent figure for the"ad-
11 More accurately,the proposalofferedinthe text was(ora current
equivalent in which therequired paymentswould be spread over aperiod of
years and have anafter-taxpresenivalue equal to (K)(l:).Itis more
convenient to deal here withonly a single payment.however, and the con-
clusions reached are notaffected by doing so.360 AP I'ENI)IX M
jiisted" capital gains rate which wasrationahied in Chapter 4,we
Can solve for the marginalpersonal ItiCUilk' tax l)racket in which the
cost of the optiOn is just equal hthe cost at its current equivalent
(1 - .50)(l - .15) = (1 - t)
= 0.575.
Therefore, only if the executive underconsideration must pay taxes on
any additions to his currentincome at a rate greater than 57.5 per cent
svill the corporation find it less expensive togrant him stock options than
to provide a salary increase ofequivalent value.
According to the tax rates in effectduring the last decade of the
period studied here 1954 throughI 963this "breakeven" point was
loca:ted at a salary levcl of approximately$77 .700, a figure which is
derived as follows: If we assume thatdeductions and exemptions from
taxable income amount to about1 5 per cent of gross income for the
typical executive,'3 the critical marginal tax rate ontaxa!)le income is
57.5 .85 = 67.6 per cent. Thus, an extradollar of salary or bonus re-
ceived by the executive'il! normally give rise to just 85 cents of addi-
tional taxable income, and it is not until he attains alevel of reward such
that taxes arc assessed on the taxable portion thereof at a67.6 per cent
marginal i'ate that he in fact incurs a tax liability of57.5 cents on the
extra dollar. Until 1964 the taxable incomebracket in which that rate
was exceeded for a married taxpayer was$76,000-to-$88,000, implying
in the view here a gross income of at least $76,000.85, or $89,400.
before the indicated percentage took effect. Now, if wefurther assume
as was suggested in Chapter 2--that theexecutive is likely to have in-
come from sources other than salary and bonusequal to 15 per cent of
the latter, an annual direct current remuneration figure of $89,400 1 .15,
or $77,700. would have been sufficient to generate atotal taxable in-
come of S76.000 and therefore represents the pointbeyond which
stock options were less costly to the employer corporation than match-
ing increases in its executives' salaries and bonuses. A similar analysis
Adjusted to reflect tile inlpact of the additional deductions and exemptions
from ordinary income likely to he generated by stock option protits and also
the posihiiitv that the optionce might hot ieelt tileshare.involved before his
death, thereby avoiding the capital gains tax entirely.
'See Chapter 2 and Appendix A.361
using the lower personal taxrates introduced in1964Ilreveals that nowadays only those executives Withsalaries and honicin excess of fully $163,70() should be grantedoptions. For therestj that cate-
gory obviously includes all hut a very fewindividuals even in thelargest firmssalarv increases tied to theprice of thecorporation's stock arc
a less expensive form of reward.
Thatis,the rates applicable to theyears 1965 and thereafter, thesebeing the end product of a two-step reduction begun in1964.
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